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“Schooling” performance measurement:  
The politics of governing teacher conduct in Australia 
Abstract 
Performance measurement (PM) in the public sector has progressively broadened to cover the 
operation of professionals traditionally framed as independent and autonomous. How PM 
reconstitutes the role and conduct of professionals is critical for understanding contemporary 
dynamics of policy and governance, and service provider-service user relationships. Building on 
Lipsky’s classic Street Level Bureaucracy, this paper examines the ways in which street-level 
professionals are reconfigured in their roles as evidenced by the operation of Australia’s schooling 
PM, NAPLAN. The paper reports findings from a project examining the effects of PM in social policy. 
Attention is given to the ambiguous and conflicting goals arising from measuring literacy and 
numeracy performance and the varied ways performance numbers are used by management for 
teacher governance at the street-level. These considerations have implications for the effectiveness 
of PM in delivering service improvements, the experience of service users, and the achievement of 
policy objectives. 
Keywords: Street level bureaucracy, performance measurement, teachers, educational 
performance, school policy, NAPLAN 
Introduction 
It is now over 30 years since Lipsky’s (1980) influential book, Street-level Bureaucracy, inaugurated a 
new conceptual lens and research agenda (Brodkin, 2012). Lipsky’s achievement was to turn analysis 
to the operation of policy in the everyday interaction between service delivery agencies and service 
users. This standpoint was a response and a challenge to public administration scholarship at the 
time that attributed failed policy implementation to the breakdown of top-down administration.  
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Instead, Lipsky’s argued that to understand the effects of policy one must focus on its enactment by 
professionals and administrators processing applications and delivering services. He controversially 
stated that policy decisions are made at ground level, where government actors interact with 
citizens. The street level perspective has generated a widely used nomenclature and an ongoing 
research agenda that remains apposite to contemporary policy research (see for example Brodkin, 
2012; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003; Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). 
Lipsky made some pertinent observations about the role of performance measurement (PM) within 
street level bureaucracies. These observations include organisations having multiple and ambiguous 
performance goals, the development of surrogate performance measures, and the problems of 
interpreting performance numbers. In addition, Lipsky also recognised that appropriate performance 
measurement can be an important tool in managing street level workers. However, the depth, 
breadth and complexity of performance measurement has grown exponentially since Lipsky’s 
original work. Accompanying these developments have been the advent of New Public Management 
(NPM) and the exponential growth of electronic information and communication technologies. 
Given these significantly changed organisational contexts, it is meaningful to reflect on 
contemporary considerations of PM in street-level bureaucracies and organisations. Indeed, to what 
extent do the observations of the past still have some validity, and what new insights and challenges 
do contemporary settings provide? 
It could be argued that in some cases PM has displaced formal policy in resolving social problems. As 
such, it is likely that the roles of street-level workers are being transformed as the political, ethical 
and power effects of PM take effect. However, the implications of these developments for street-
level delivery of publicly-funded services have not been thoroughly examined. Yet this is critical for 
understanding the contemporary dynamics of policy and governance, the relationship between the 
state, public service providers and service users and the achievement public policy objectives. 
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In the context of this special edition, the paper engages with the lower reaches of Lewis’ (this issue) 
chain of performance measurement via its consideration of how local contextual conditions can 
shape the actions of street-level professionals. Lewis articulates a ‘chain’ of performance 
measurement flowing from broad macro settings, including context and policy and criteria, through 
rules and understandings, to actions, outputs and consequences. Moreover, rather than take a 
systemic view of the PM system, this paper examines these dynamics at a localised level, where local 
context and settings mediate macro ones (Hupe & Buffat, 2014). Lewis (this issue) also importantly 
contrasts a dominant ‘rational-scientific’ perspective on performance measurement with a ‘realistic-
political’ perspective. 
These dynamics are illustrated by analysing Australia’s schooling PM. The National Assessment 
Program - Literacy And Numeracy (NAPLAN) is an initiative directed at providing parents, teachers, 
school administrators, state and federal governments with information about student (and school 
and teacher) performance in literacy and numeracy. Case studies of two schools, from two different 
socio-economic communities are presented. The purpose of these two different case study schools 
is to understand the potential multiple ways in which educational PM positions teachers and 
schools, the varied responses of such professionals and their managers, and the interaction with 
socio-economic context. Their selection from the extreme ends of the socio-economic spectrum is in 
no way held to be representative of high or low socio-economic schools, their teachers and their 
managers, nor do they posit a continuum between them. Rather, they seek to illustrate the diversity, 
and offer potential insights into the role of contextual factors in these dynamics. In doing so they 
add nuance and complexity to the conceptual understanding of the political dynamics of PM. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with Lipsky’s insights on the operation 
of performance measurement at the street-level. The second section outlines NAPLAN, and the third 
outlines the project from which empirical data reported in this paper are drawn. The next two 
sections present key themes about teachers’ experience of PM within schools, namely ambiguous 
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and conflicting goals, and the use of performance data in the management of teachers. The paper’s 
concluding discussion draws out the politics and consequences of PM for street-level professionals 
and the implications for public service organisations and service users. 
Street Level Bureaucracy, Performance Measurement and Schooling 
In undertaking a street-level perspective of PM, it is informative to return to Lipsky’s original work 
(1980, ch.4 & pp. 162-72). He observed the existence of myriad and ambiguous goals operating at 
street level and three areas of conflict: between client-centred versus social engineering goals, 
client-centred versus organisational goals and contradictory role expectations. Moreover, often the 
activity of street-level agencies is not readily quantifiable, such as service user wellbeing and service 
quality. Further, the outcomes to which street-level workers seek to achieve are often affected by a 
range of factors beyond their control meaning that interpreting measurements of performance is 
fraught. Specifically, it is highly problematic to attribute any particular activity as the cause of change 
in measured performance. As a consequence, Lipsky observes that “street-level bureaucrats’ 
performance often eludes effective evaluation” (1980, p. 49). 
This difficulty does not, however, mean that measurements of street-level performance is not 
attempted, nor undertaken, nor even that it should not be done: “street-level bureaucracies do seize 
on some aspects of performance to measure. They tend to seek reports on what can be measured as 
a means of exercising control” (1980, p. 51). Thus, easy to count phenomena and readily available 
data – such as numbers of client encounters, educational qualifications of staff and years of 
experience – are used as approximations of performance or quality. But this increased attempt at 
control by managers of street-level bureaucrats is not an unproblematic endeavour. Lipsky opined 
that measurements of performance immediately define concrete goals that street-level actors are 
likely to concentrate on: “If teachers are assessed or even remotely evaluated on the proportion of 
their charges who pass year-end examinations, more will pass as teachers ‘teach the test’” (1980, p. 
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166). However, given the multiplicity and ambiguity of goals in street-level agencies, this can 
displace other important goals, or indeed create goal-conflict in the minds of street-level workers. 
Consequently, iatrogenic problems include “inducing behaviour to conform to the measure, 
neglecting other responsibilities, and inauthentically performing according to the measured 
standards” (1980, p. 167). Accordingly, performance results may construct a veneer of performance 
and accountability. 
Thus, the experiences of street-level actors in the contemporary, post- NPM, quasi-marketised and 
hyper-quantified settings are not unique. However, there have been several developments that have 
meant that with regard to performance measurement “the dilemmas that Lipsky first identified 
three decades ago have intensified” (Brodkin, 2012, p. 945). What is labelled NPM, that is business 
management practices and market mechanisms, has been more widely utilised in the public sector 
and indeed in the delivery of public services. Part of the NPM agenda is giving localised managers 
greater freedom to manage accountability, not by rules but by performance improvement targets. 
An associated dimension to this development is the greater use of outsourcing and contracting, 
which again is often governed by performance outcomes. Both these shifts have also meant that 
managers have had a greater imperative to more clearly assess and direct street-level actors and 
constrain or recast their discretionary conduct. Brodkin observes that “As the search for ways to 
manage street-level organisations has advanced in the past few decades, arguably few strategies 
have expanded as dramatically as the use of performance measurement…the practice of managing 
by performance measurement has become virtually ubiquitous” (2012, p. 945). 
As Lipsky and other street-level researchers have noted (Brodkin, 2008; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003), 
the drive to insert PM into street-level practice is largely based on an attempt at managing and 
governing street-level actors and the discretion they exercise. This need to govern is both about 
ensuring effectiveness, but also about collective and individual accountability.  
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Australia’s educational performance measurement: NAPLAN  
As a federated state, Australia’s schooling context is complex. Australia’s six states and two territory 
governments have constitutional authority to maintain their own public education systems, thus a 
national system of schooling does not exist. There is also a sizeable non-government school sector, 
accounting for about 30 percent of students, made up of Catholic, elite and other independent 
schools. Whilst the Federal government provides some needs-based school funding for state and 
territory schools, they do not hold constitutional responsibility for education policy (Jamrozik, 2009; 
Kenway, 2006). States, which are constitutionally responsible for policy and delivery of schooling, are 
dependent on the Federal government for educational funding. Thus, education is a shared, but 
asymmetric responsibility of governance in Australia that sets the context for potential State 
compliance with national policy direction (Lingard, 2000). Accordingly, over the last few decades 
there has been an evident increase in centralisation in terms of curriculum (Masters, 2010), 
accreditation of teacher education courses and teaching registration (Gillard, 2009). 
Until recently, Australia’s approach to school accountability was based on states producing their own 
approaches to reviewing schools with varying degrees of independent or external verification and 
systems of reporting (Gurr, 2007). NAPLAN, as a national approach for assessing the performance of 
Australia’s schooling, has arisen from the aforementioned complex educational arrangements. Other 
pressures include international trends that position large scale assessment as a form of litmus test 
for systemic health (Masters, 2005, 2007; OECD, 2010), neo-liberal  reforms in education (Connell, 
2013) and addressing Australia’s declining relative performance in OECD testing regimes since 2000.  
NAPLAN takes a census approach. Annually, all Australian school students are tested in Years 3, 5, 7 
and 9 in reading, writing, spelling, grammar and punctuation, and numeracy administered by 
classroom teachers under strict protocols. A NAPLAN Summary report is published and individual 
student reports are sent to parents. Aggregated results at school and grade level are published on a 
specialised and prominent website, www.MySchool.edu.au. The Australian Curriculum and 
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Reporting Authority (ACARA), an independent government statutory body, has responsibility for the 
development, management and administration of both NAPLAN and the My School website. Whilst 
publishing results on the website intensifies PM effects and generated substantive concerns (Mills, 
2015; Niesche, 2015), our focus is on the actual PM. Indeed, My School was not a dominant concern 
within our studied schools.   
Research project and data 
The findings presented in this paper draw from a larger project on PM in Australian social policy. 
Participants in the schooling part of the project include federal and state senior bureaucrats, interest 
groups, state level managers, school level administrators, teachers and parents. Given, the street 
level focus this paper pays particular attention to the teachers and principals within the study. 
The schooling case study data was collected in 2013 in the Australian state of Queensland; five years 
after NAPLAN’s initial implementation. Queensland’s relative underperformance in NAPLAN testing 
was widely recognised following the first reporting of NAPLAN results in 2008. In response, the 
Queensland government commissioned a review of primary school education (Masters, 2009) that 
swiftly led to major structural reforms, teaching and learning audits, improvement targets and a 
renewed focus on school leadership. Consequently, improvement of student, teacher and state 
performance in Queensland state schools acutely focused on principal management of teaching and 
learning activities.  
Two government primary school case sites, within one Queensland Education region, were 
purposively selected in light of well documented correlations between socio-economic status and 
literacy levels: one in a high socio-economic community; and one in a low socio-economic 
community. Across these two schools, semi-structured interviews were conducted with four school 
managers (e.g. Principals, Deputies) and nine classroom teachers. Interview questions explored 
different aspects of performance measurement such as data production, usage and reporting and 
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their organisational and individual consequences. The questions sought participant experiences of 
school-parent relationships with NAPLAN. The management and analysis of thematically coded data 
drew on Miles and Huberman (1994), involving processes of data reduction and data display to 
facilitate conclusion drawing, and was assisted using NVIVO. 
Situated in an affluent, metropolitan suburb, with a stable homogeneous student body, Woodlands 
State School’s student population has significant socio-educational advantage; four-fifths are located 
in the Australia’s top quartile of households, and a tenth has a non-English speaking background.  
In contrast, Edgefield State School is located in a disadvantaged metropolitan area with students’ 
from a wide range of minority communities residing in nearby public and low cost housing. Three-
quarters of students are located in the bottom quartile of Australian households, and over a half 
have non-English speaking backgrounds. Increasing numbers of refugee students with limited or no 
English, stalled or restricted education, and traumatic personal experiences requiring daily attention 
are challenging issues for the School.  
Ambiguous and conflicting goals at the street-level 
Consistent with the work of Lipsky, school teachers experienced ambiguous and conflicting 
professional goals arising from NAPLAN, though the expression of this varied between the two case 
study schools. The delivery of education services is frequently muddied by competing philosophies 
as to the purpose of education and compounded by the politics of reform (Ball, 2003).This is further 
complicated by increased accountability via the use of performance measures. The focal points of 
tension described by Lipsky acknowledge the political nature of performance measures apparent 
clash with the logic of professional judgement. At one level, a performance measure is regarded as a 
proxy, partial or indicative measure for a wider performance objective or goal, yet in doing so that 
very measure can displace the wider goal to become the actual goal. The proxy becomes the goal. At 
another level, there is often ambiguity about what the wider goal actually is. For clarity to prevail, 
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this ambiguity can lead to a further focusing on the measure.  Goal tensions are especially felt by 
professionals who prescribe to wider professional goals alongside organisational ones. 
These dynamics are evident in the case study schools, whereby the import of NAPLAN is locally 
enacted by teachers as they navigate multiple layers of accountability in response to their divergent 
student populations and contexts. Their contexts provide some indication of what teachers are held 
to account for, and to whom they are accountable (Brodkin, 2008). 
At the national political and policy level there has been a history of multiple and changing purposes 
for NAPLAN and what it seeks to do, both technically and politically. The authority overseeing 
NAPLAN and its reporting depict the assessment as a simple apolitical measurement exercise: 
It should be emphasised that NAPLAN is a tool to inform school improvement, not an 
improver of educational outcomes. It is not the test that will improve students’ literacy and 
numeracy skills, but the way students’ results (including school, system and national level 
results) are used by teachers, schools and systems to identify strengths and weaknesses, 
particularly in teaching practices and programs, that will improve student outcomes. The 
measure of NAPLAN’s success will always be the uses to which the resulting data are put to 
improve teaching and learning (ACARA, 2013, p. 7). 
At the same time, ACARA has various stated that it is diagnostic of individual educational 
performance and then shied from this remark. It is noted that educational performance is equated 
with literacy and numeracy, and educational performance with school performance; thus proxies 
displace goals.  
This technical construct of NAPLAN sits uncomfortably alongside its policy and political construction. 
The original political architects of NAPLAN, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, and his then Deputy and 
Minister for Education Julia Gillard, saw national testing as a strategy to support more efficient and 
effective investment of Commonwealth funding (such as targeting funding where it is most needed), 
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and improving student performance to drive productivity (Rudd & Gillard, 2008). A key component 
of this vision was the opportunity for NAPLAN to crystallise choice for parents by providing rigorous 
data on school performance. Other policy-political imperatives include raising the performance of 
students from low-socioeconomic backgrounds (Dawkins, 2012), the establishment of a centralised 
system of State and Territory accountability (Zanderigo, Dowd, & Turner, 2012), strengthening of the 
education market and the creation of a national education policy field (Lingard, 2010). 
At the case study schools, there was a similar ambiguity about the goal of NAPLAN.  Coalface 
interpretations alternatively accepted, rejected or resisted the role of the high-stakes testing in 
changing professional activity and norms, accountability, professional learning and decision making. 
At times, explicit resistance or rejection of some NAPLAN goals accompanied actions that implicitly 
accepted others, signifying the complex process through which the teachers made sense of their 
practice (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003). These disparities within and across the schools’ staff reflect 
the disjointed discourse on the purpose of NAPLAN that appears to have characterised its general 
implementation (Senate Standing Committee on Education and Employment, 2014). Concomitant 
with these ambiguous goals, was a shifting construction of who the performer is whose performance 
is measured – the student, the teacher or the school –mirroring the multiple macro level messages. 
However, at the street level, the goals of NAPLAN were overshadowed by teachers’ construction of 
their professional goals vis-à-vis NAPLAN. These professional goals were significantly shaped by the 
exigencies of everyday practice within their local student and management contexts. 
Woodlands State School 
NAPLAN performance and the prospects of individual student success weighed heavily on 
Woodlands’ teachers as they situated themselves as mediators of competing agendas seeking to 
shape children’s agency. One year 3 teacher illustrated a typical sentiment expressed throughout the 
interviews:  
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I make sure that my kids are not so much protected from NAPLAN, but I make sure my kids 
aren’t exposed to you know, “Oh my god, it’s the biggest thing you’re ever going to do” 
(Teacher W1) 
In saying so, this teacher differentiated NAPLAN testing from the political dimensions of high-stakes 
testing. Professional action, in this instance was directed at resisting the adultification of childhood 
via academic expectations, pressures and stress and precocious knowledge (Bousfield & Ragusa, 
2014).  
Despite most Woodlands’ students performing well above national averages, each teacher 
interviewed was aware of the importance of individual student performances to parents aiming to 
enrol their children in private schools. This parent concern as a driver of their professional practice is 
reflected in one teacher’s account of parental interest to classroom practice: 
I think the parents certainly just want the best for their kids. It’s not necessarily, “They have 
to achieve this mark,” but they certainly take more of an interest in how they’re doing... to 
push them up to that level and what kind of predictions they might come up with. (Teacher 
W3)  
Arguably, the strong and consistent parental sentiment on the value of good NAPLAN performances 
perceived by the staff created a commitment to have students ready and able to achieve solid 
NAPLAN scores. In this respect, preparing for testing was perceived as a professional responsibility. 
Yet, teachers recognised students as capable of delivering impressive scores in NAPLAN testing, 
resulting from highly educated, educationally-engaged and economically-advantaged parents. Such 
‘learning-ready’ students at Woodlands clearly posed no impediment to the teachers’ capacity to 
undertake their professional role to educate. Accordingly, the setting and reaching of targets to 
meet school and institutional goals was professionally feasible, built on an assumption that student 
performance reflected teacher performance. In this respect, the teachers positioned themselves as 
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lucky by virtue of their student enrolment and mindful of their relative professional vulnerability 
should they move to a less advantaged school. One teacher remarked: 
They do what they need to do and we are proud of our NAPLAN results, but I don’t think – 
you know, you transport the same teachers and put them in a school out in [a disadvantaged 
area], you’re not getting the same results. It’s as simple as that. It is because we don’t have 
to really do a great deal to do well at NAPLAN, that it’s not such a serious point. (Teacher 
W1) 
In brief, Woodlands was open to strong market mechanisms in light of community views that the 
school served as an important staging point for independent school selection processes reliant on 
individual  NAPLAN scores (Tovey, 2013). In addition, the student body provided a homogeneous and 
stable teaching context open to standard and efficient responses to literacy and numeracy 
development. In other words, an ideal context for a technical-rational understanding (Lewis, this 
issue)of teacher professionalism and the application of managerial efforts to establish street-level 
control. 
Edgefield State School 
An overarching concern for the staff at Edgefield School, where over half the students have language 
backgrounds other than English, were the consequences for students of a national testing regime 
that privileges native English speakers and Western norms of education (Creagh, 2013; Freeman, 
2013). One school manager remarked: 
I don’t personally feel that NAPLAN has serviced them at all. It’s very much disadvantaging 
our kids because - …the teachers get very emotional and very upset when they watch their 
kids doing the NAPLAN testing, because they’re not able to demonstrate their 
understandings or their skills in the format that’s presented. (Manager EC) 
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Teachers felt disempowered by an imposed assessment practice they viewed as inequitable; 
reflecting limited external understandings of what constitutes the measurement of meaningful 
achievement in disadvantaged student populations. Of particular concern, was how NAPLAN 
reporting constructed ‘good’ and ‘bad’ students without due consideration of learning barriers that 
had to be overcome. 
Edgefield teachers appeared as protective of students’ learning identities as their Woodlands 
counterparts. However, whilst the latter were concerned with NAPLAN performance as a predictor 
of future success and access to private high schools, Edgefield teachers were concerned that 
NAPLAN was a meaningless assessment of their students’ capacities.  
Like Woodlands, Edgefield teachers and managers saw their professional role as increasing NAPLAN 
performance. However, Edgefield staff saw this being achieved by developing meaningful and 
genuine teacher-student relationships that were at risk due to home circumstances, and some 
community values that did not adequately valorise learning. For example, one teacher reflected on 
how student absenteeism impacted on her professional responsibilities: 
I find those things really distressing, as a teacher to think “How can I get this poor little one 
to come up [in their literacy performance]?” Especially if they’re a child that needed that 
extra support anyway, and to get them to come along with everyone. (Teacher E7) 
Language barriers were also a commonly expressed limitation to professional practice:  
We have a lot of ESL [English as a Second Language] children as well that clearly don’t know 
the language, so we have to give them some assessment. But we can’t afford to penalise 
them because they don’t know the language – but how do we know what they know, if we 
don’t know their language? So it’s quite difficult. (Teacher E8) 
In light of these perceived restrictions on the teachers’ professionalism, substantive improvements 
in NAPLAN performance were viewed as an unattainable goal.  
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Perhaps as a consequence of this view, collective NAPLAN preparation at Edgefield was not a priority 
and instead left to the discretion of the teachers. Nevertheless, the test was positioned as a 
significant and collective event for the students, including a school-organised breakfast on NAPLAN 
testing days, and a special school assembly where students who meet the national benchmarks were 
publicly rewarded. This ceremony posed professional challenges due to perceived disconnections 
between public and student experiences, and between public and organisational communication:  
being a PR exercise, we ramp it up as well. We say “aren’t they fantastic”, and yet the 
message we get in the staff room from the Principal is quite the opposite. You know it’s not 
disparaging, but it’s certainly “the results are disastrous, they’re ugly, they’re horrible - we’ve 
got to do something. (Teacher E8) 
Professional concerns were also expressed about how this public differentiation of “good” and “bad” 
students could impact on students’ commitment to learning. 
It was good to showcase that, but I was standing there as a teacher calling out those people's 
names and I'm looking at those eight little people that were sitting on the floor that didn't 
get any recognition, I have a major problem with that. So what are we doing to the kids if 
we're doing all that to those eight little people? They're never going to try, especially if 
you're doing it to them in Grade 3. (Teacher E7) 
In summary, the two schools shared professional goals around mediating NAPLAN pressures on 
students which was held in tension with the goal of enhancing individuals’ measured performance, 
and reflections on their own professional performance. However, these professional goals were 
configured very differently as a consequence of the very different student (and parent) cohort they 
taught. 
Leadership, data, discretion and the professional 
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As Lipsky (1980) observed, PM can be a useful management tool to shape the discretionary conduct 
of street level professionals (see also Prior & Barnes, 2011; Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). In schools, 
NAPLAN constitutes the performance of individual students, and when aggregated to the classroom 
is a proxy for teacher performance. This latter measure is highly contested given the well-
understood relationship between (NAPLAN) student performance and parental social, economic and 
educational status. Arguably, much of the aggregate variations of NAPLAN performance are 
explained by socioeconomic status (Carmichael, MacDonald, & McFarland-Piazza, 2014). How school 
principals and deputies used such performance data reflected both socio-economic contexts and 
leadership styles that were partly shaped by those contexts. 
The distinction between the two principals’ approaches to NAPLAN and other educational 
performance data and its value for evaluation and developing teacher professionalism is notable. 
The Woodlands principal was a self-described ‘numbers person’ who ‘liberated’ the data to provide 
the framework for professional activity. The Edgefield principal felt the data was primarily for 
systemic purposes, and not useful in developing teacher professionalism or part of a management 
framework, preferring to kept it within the school management team.   
Woodlands State School 
Woodlands management took a coordinated and carefully orchestrated approach to improving 
quantified measures of school performance. Whilst this action closely aligned to the data usage 
strategies promoted by Education Queensland, the Principal’s personal motivation for uptake was 
aimed at strengthening teacher professionalism; the focus on enhancing teaching and learning 
overrode concerns with PM limitations. This principal described the necessity of first developing a 
shared understanding of the goals within a numbers-based performance framework, and a strategy 
for their realisation:  
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If you want to improve outcomes, you’ve got to have everybody on board and…you’ve got to 
have a framework to work within to ensure those teachers can perform. … what we try to do 
is take on board all those things and really, because it was just a very defined framework to 
work within, I took full advantage of that situation with staff…, “They’ve highlighted we need 
to do x, y, and z” and then have some form of agreement to say “Yeah, we really need to 
step up on that” because the focus is the children; it’s not anything else but improving 
teaching and learning and it’s student outcomes. (Manager WA) 
This framework centred on the use of classroom assessment data as the basis for six-weekly 
manager-teacher discussions focused on activity to reach benchmarks and interventions for 
individual students. Accordingly, goal ambiguity was reduced through data usage and re-affirming 
the duty of care through professional development, albeit potentially with some goal displacement. 
Consequently, tensions associated with using NAPLAN to drive student literacy and numeracy 
improvements were deftly overcome; teachers were gathered under the umbrella of guided, 
professional control. The use of student assessment data was viewed as numbers based teacher 
professionalism:  
I think they’re things that… we should be doing anyway as professionals; using our data, 
analysing our practice, sharing our practice, building a community of learners. I see that as 
good practice. (Management WB) 
Thus, assessment data for teacher performance management was internally driven and locally 
focused. Importantly, student performance data was not focused on NAPLAN outcomes. Rather, 
NAPLAN precipitated wider, more intensified numbers-based performance governance at both the 
system and local levels, yet still primarily focused on literacy and numeracy. For some teachers, this 
model of practice heralded a new local auditability:  
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I guess it’s made teachers more accountable so that you’re striving to do better but…there’s 
good and bad in that. Some teachers get stressed out by it; I like it. I’ve got to do better. Well 
not better; improve. I always want to find better ways to do it. (Teacher W4)  
Although accountability loomed large, numerical governance was done to inform managerial 
oversight and professional development, rather than as heavy-handed, acritical, numbers-dictated 
management. Performance data was viewed as a collective, and not just an individual, performance 
improvement process.  
It’s sharing strategies. I guess moderation in a sense of seeing are we implementing things 
the same way, picking bits from people have observed - people who have had success with 
and letting others observe in that way. … [I]it feels to me like a sharing process of successes 
and also looking at areas for improvement. (Teacher W3) 
Teachers therefore accepted and saw benefits in management oversight of their pedagogy and 
curriculum delivery. Data as a foundation for a professional dialogue was viewed as an opportunity 
for personal and collective professional growth. One teacher remarked on the personal motivations 
that stemmed from an open conversation on classroom data:  
It definitely has made me, I think, a better teacher because - I know if they’re looking at my 
data, I want it to be good. I want to teach well… - when they’re checking up and you’re 
accountable, you’re striving to do the best you can all the time and always improve. So I 
guess in that way, it’s good. (Teacher W4) 
Despite increased pedagogical and curriculum steering, individual professional discretion was recast 
as collective and positioned within a numbers framework. While the boundaries of autonomy were 
reduced, teachers felt little compromise to their autonomy given the free and frank professional 
dialogue within data discussions. At the same time, they showed little awareness of how the 
numbers themselves had substantially reframed the space of professional autonomy.  
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Edgefield State School 
The overriding perception of inadequacies of NAPLAN in measuring educational performance at 
Edgefield, led to minimal management direction of teacher conduct in relation to NAPLAN. In light of 
a challenging learning environment, management took a ‘hands-off’ approach by providing teachers 
with considerable autonomy and discretion to engage with NAPLAN preparation, curriculum and 
pedagogy.  
So what we need is quality staff, who have got the capacity to manage themselves. It's not 
only about the pedagogy….. When those children have very complex lives, you can become 
overwhelmed and feel “what can you do to solve the problem?” Well, the reality is that you 
can't solve the problems but you need to help them to manage. (Management ED) 
 Thus, there are clear expectations that teachers at the school require substantial self-regulation and 
a capacity to venture into areas of practice beyond the traditional remit of teaching such as 
managing student absenteeism, conflict within families, and differing cultural expectations of 
educational goals. Management was guided by a belief that their school environment defied 
numbers driven educational practice arising from NAPLAN. This rationale underpinned the 
discretionary power granted to teachers as core professional tasks were instead directed at 
equipping students with social, emotional and cultural capacity. Interwoven within this narrative is 
recognition of the unmeasurable moral and ethical conundrums that flooded the professional 
decision making required within the school.  
in terms of the big picture thinking, we don’t go into minute detail, because that’s not what 
is relevant for the classroom teacher. It’s relevant for us because we are the ones that are at 
the strategic level trying to set the goals and help teachers set the goals. We can’t 
overwhelm people, and people are feeling very overwhelmed at the moment. (Manager ED) 
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However, this protective action by school management seemed to generate professional tensions 
for some of the teachers, with consequences for how they navigated conflicting goals arising from 
NAPLAN. The decision not to discuss educational performance data with teachers appeared to 
undermine some teachers’ trust in the school’s capacity to improve performance and therefore the 
legitimacy of the school and its staff. One interviewee commented:  
I don't see the deputy or the principal up here watching people's classes, knowing what 
they're doing, so I suppose they place a lot on the systemic data, because when we have 
meetings we get told we're doing a really good job, but we're still falling below the [NAPLAN] 
benchmarks. I don't know what that statement means. I find that a really grey sort of thing to 
say, but I really don't know how they're going to evaluate stuff. (Teacher E7) 
Here goal ambiguity was magnified for the teacher by virtue of the conflicting performance 
messages. Accordingly, there was a perception that insufficient attention was being given to 
collective professional dialogue in order to overcome goal conflict and develop a consensus on role 
expectations. One interviewee remarked that staff meetings did not capitalise on the opportunity for 
a free and frank forum:  
[Other schools] have a staff meeting where they have professional dialogue rather than just 
a lecture and that’s what we get. A lecture pretty much. (Teacher E9) 
The absence of shared professional conversation about teaching and student performance as 
numerated through NAPLAN magnified a sense of professional isolation felt by some teachers and 
the professional concerns about improving measured performance compared to perhaps more basic 
educational goals.  
The teachers questioned their individual capacity to develop strategies and approaches that might 
overcome the school’s significant structural constraints in delivering improved NAPLAN 
performances demanded by the State. Teachers were left to self-manage in isolation and became 
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overwhelmed with what they saw as their professional responsibility to educate students and 
improve their measured performance as demanded by the national NAPLAN narrative. One teacher 
commented on the general sense of responsibility felt staff: 
teachers dragging themselves to work because they just think, "I have to get this done. I have 
to do that." I think that's an indictment where the pressure comes from, because you think 
you can never have a day off because then the kids will be a day behind, and that's where 
I've seen it change over the last five years too. (Teacher E7) 
Another teacher was acutely aware of the school’s relative local district performance. 
I could see the results when we moderated some of their kids work. Their work was 
significantly superior to ours. “What else did you teach them in that time? You know, did you 
teach them letter writing? Did you teach them sentence structure? Did you teach them 
poetry? Did you teach them anything at all else?” I guess that given it’s a national, and it’s a 
standardised test, maybe I am disadvantaging my kids when I know that other teachers are 
doing it like that. (Teacher E9) 
These comments reveal a moral self-questioning of their professional activities and the consequence 
for NAPLAN performance. The latter comment clearly demonstrates a personal burden in the 
‘unmeasured’ discretionary action ultimately taken, implicitly connecting an individual working 
ideology to a hierarchy of organisational and political dynamics (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003) 
Accordingly, a degree of unease existed with a perceived lack of management oversight over their 
discretionary activity for two of the teachers interviewed with regard to:  the underutilisation of data 
for teaching and learning purposes; the lack of peer evaluation; and an absence of collective and 
professional dialogue on how to address the performance challenges facing the school:  
I think those things need to happen. And then you can test your data that way; did that work, 
and if it doesn't work what are you going to do? There needs to be more follow-up, more 
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substantive conversation about how you're going to move children along, because really, 
apart from all this systemic testing, it's our job to move children, and you have to be able to 
show that movement. So even if they're not going to achieve the things on NAPLAN, what 
are they going to achieve? So we need to be all working together as a team to do that. 
(Teacher E7) 
It is clear from this quote, that there was a desire for collective management engagement with what 
educational performance data meant for professional responses to enhance measured performance 
from within a context that acknowledged that the measured performance was an unfair assessment 
of their professional conduct and of the students’ structural disadvantage.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper charted the dynamics of educational (specifically, literacy and numeracy) PM at the 
street-level and the effects on professional teacher practice. The divergent findings from two very 
different schools demonstrate that PM does not induce uniform dynamics within street-level 
organisations.  
What was uniform was the widespread ambiguity and multiplicity of goals concomitant for the 
NAPLAN PM, reflective of the political macro-construction of NAPLAN’s purpose. One key finding is 
that teachers largely did not preoccupy themselves with the wider goals of NAPLAN, instead focusing 
on professional goals constituted in relation to NAPLAN, such as preparing for the test, reducing 
performance anxiety and supporting students. Managing for NAPLAN became one of their 
professional duties of care.  
Lewis’ (this issue) distinction between the rational-scientific and the realistic-political model of PM, 
unexpectedly mapped closely to the two studied schools. Located in a socio-economically advantage 
community, Woodlands State School appeared to operate closely to the rational-scientific model, 
whereby the principal engaged with teachers around diagnostic data conversations to, formulate 
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professional responses and evaluate outcomes. In contrast, the dynamics in Edgefield State School’s 
socio-economically disadvantaged community and diverse student population, demonstrated many 
of the markings of the realistic-political model. Significantly, the PM was largely ignored and de-
coupled from teaching practices. Teachers in the former school had a clear performance and 
accountability framework constituted by performance numbers, while the teachers in the latter had 
a non-numerical performance and accountability framework to support disadvantaged learners.  
The socio-economic differences between the two schools and their associated engagement with PM 
strongly suggest that the rational-scientific model can only operate in certain conditions. Indeed, the 
ideal of performance management is predicted on ideal conditions. Staff at Woodlands were acutely 
aware of their student cohort characteristics; largely homogenous in English as a first language, non-
disabled, non-indigenous, education and economically advantaged households with high attendance 
rates. Students began school ‘education-ready’, with engaged parents who valued and understood 
educational practices. Moreover, the high level of educational performance of this student cohort 
largely reflected their household circumstances, and not the professional conduct of the teachers. 
Thus, there was no performance stigma for the school and its teachers, although there were some 
demands on teachers to raise collective and individual student performance. These realities made it 
possible for the rational-scientific performance model of operate.  
In contrast, the complex realities facing Edgefield students in fractured households and communities 
and migration backgrounds, meant that they and their teachers faced multiple hurdles in delivering 
educational performance. In short, many of the children were not ‘education ready’, and the 
teachers and the school saw this as their primary professional task. Accordingly, performance data 
was constructed by some management and teaching as largely disconnected to their professional 
roles, whilst others struggled with the performance challenge it posed. Having excised performance 
data as a framework for professional practice, teachers had a sense of floundering and being 
overwhelmed without a satisfactory way to imbed it into their professional role. 
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One interpretation for this disparity in performance management is to say it reflects different 
management styles within each school. There was evidence of this, but it would be highly misleading 
to interpret this as a reflection of different leadership styles or management ‘personalities’. Rather, 
these different management styles are intrinsically connected to the very different student cohort of 
each school. Contexts matter (Hupe & Buffat, 2014). 
These dynamics have considerable implications for the conduct of street-level professionals and 
their exercise of professional autonomy and discretion (Prior & Barnes, 2011; Rowe, 2012). It has 
long been argued that professionals, such as teachers, are able to exercise professional judgement 
and discretion and their accountability is to the profession. Lipsky (1980) also observed discretion as 
an ever present reality of street-level bureaucracies, regardless of whether the actors are 
professionals or administrators, and that PM is an important management tool in directing those 
actors. Apart from PM technologies, there is also a long-standing argument that new information 
technologies are ‘reducing’ professional discretion (Braverman, 1974; Garson, 1989), whereas others 
argue that the technologies do not ‘reduce’, but ‘recast’ professional autonomy and discretion 
(Dearman, 2005). The findings reported in this paper also demonstrate that the impact of PM on 
professional autonomy is not a simple story of it being curtailed. Rather, it was observed that PM 
provided a new framework for evaluating and transforming professional practice. In making visible 
student performance and linking this to professional performance, performance data constituted 
professional conduct and performance in particular ways the import of which was not immediately 
obvious to the professionals, especially those in Woodlands State School. Rather, the numbers were 
viewed as a natural and objective measure for professional conduct, and provided a natural 
framework for exercising professional autonomy. While staff from Edgefield State School critiqued 
and eschewed the data as being irrelevant to assessing their professional conduct, they nevertheless 
found themselves either without an alternative frame for accounting for their professional conduct 
or challenged by its presence (Ball, 2003). These staff had autonomy devoid of clear professional 
guideposts in order direct their discretion. In short, PM is best articulated as a professional 
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framework for exercising autonomy and accountability, which can be juxtaposed against alternative 
frames of autonomy and accountability, such as caring for the wellbeing of children, integrating into 
the workforce and/or society, or forming life-long learners. PM recasts and enumerates professional 
discretion subtlety by defining a prescribed (and arguably principal) frame of reference in which it 
can be enacted. 
In summary, this paper demonstrates that the context of PM matters in understanding their 
dynamics within street-level organisations shaping professional conduct. Moreover, the widely-held 
rational-scientific model of performance governance is not so much as wrong or misplaced, but 
predicated on specific, laboratory-like contexts whereby exogenous factors provide the perfect 
environment for performance and performance management to flourish. Indeed, it helps too if the 
performers come to that environment already performing well. As a consequence, if policy makers 
seek to use performance measurement to drive performance, they first need to build a 
performance-ripe environment. 
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